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Introduction
In the summer of 1929 a man put his finger to a button. The man was Charles
Augustus Lindbergh, the patron saint of American aviation, and the button was at one
end of a Western Union telegraph circuit that connected Los Angeles to New York City.
At 3:05 PM, Pacific Standard Time, Lindbergh pressed the button, then pressed it again.
Three thousand miles away, in the train shed of New York City's Pennsylvania Station, a
light flashed, twice. At that signal and to the cheers of thousands, a train named The
Airway Limited chuffed away from the platform and began its overnight journey to
Columbus, Ohio.1 In the train's observation car were seventeen passengers, men and
women, transcontinental travelers of a new age. The train was the first link in a hybrid
air-rail system that would carry them across the country. Forty-eight hours later, these
passengers would arrive in Los Angeles. Their journey between the two coasts would
be faster than any before it.
With the push of a button, Lindbergh formally opened Transcontinental Air
Transport, America's first transcontinental passenger airline. The airline would halve the
time necessary to cross the continent and open a new age in passenger aviation. And,
in its short history, the airline also embodied ideas about the possibilities of flight, the
limitations of technology, the necessity of compromises, the power of celebrity, and the
promise of national integration. Activated by Lindbergh's button, these ideas exploded
outward at his push, leaving marks on the physical and cultural landscapes of America
—marks that are still present today.

1

"Lindbergh and His Bride Here" The Los Angeles Times, 8 Jul. 1929: 1. ProQuest Historical Newspapers
Los Angeles Times (1881-1986), 2 Nov. 2009.

Fraga 2

Two years earlier, in 1927, Lindbergh had climbed into a single-engine plane and
taken off from a Long Island airfield on an attempt to fly across the Atlantic Ocean. After
thirty-three hours, he landed in Paris, and his success thrilled Americans to the
possibilities of aviation. Equally thrilled was Clement Keys, an aviation octopus in
control of twenty-six different companies. After a brief courtship, the two joined forces in
May of 1928 to create Transcontinental Air Transport, Inc. This venture represented a
new way of thinking about aviation. Unlike airmail carriers, T.A.T. was to be an airline for
passengers: It would carry them in luxury and comfort and its revenue would come
solely from their fares, not from the lucrative government contracts that supported
airmail. On July 7, 1929, after more than a year of planning and promotion, the airline
opened at the push of a button, to national acclaim. The Los Angeles Times hailed the
airline with the headline "Chapter Added to Aviation History."2
But a year later, T.A.T. was gone. Without the subsidy of airmail contracts, the
airline lost money on every flight. Further battered by the stock market crash of October
1929, the company's directors acceded to Postmaster General Walter Folger Brown's
request that T.A.T. merge with Western Air Express, an airmail carrier. On July 15, 1930,
a year and eight days after Lindbergh pushed his button, the two companies gave birth
to Transcontinental and Western Air. Their progeny thrived. T.&W.A. became T.W.A.,
Trans-World Airlines, one of the largest airlines in America and the country's de facto
national carrier at the close of the twentieth century. T.A.T. was left a holding company,
an empty shell. It dissolved in 1934.
This essay is about that forgotten airline.
2

"Chapter Added to Aviation History," The Los Angeles Times, 8 Jul. 1929: A1. ProQuest Historical
Newspapers Los Angeles Times (1881-1986), 2 Nov. 2009.
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–––––––––––––––––––
I make several related arguments in this paper. First, I argue that Clement Keys
and Transcontinental Air Transport brought passenger service to the skies. The airline
set the paradigm for passenger aviation, reassuring Americans that they could expect
comfort and safety from this new—and, to many Americans, still scary—form of travel.
T.A.T. partnered with the Pennsylvania Railroad and built on earlier models of
passenger service—such as George Pullman's railway coaches and Fred Harvey's
eating houses—to meet passengers' expectations for service. The airline marketed itself
to business travelers and tourists alike, showing how different types of travelers could
benefit from the speed of the airplane. T.A.T. domesticated aviation, taking it out of the
realm of the daredevil pilots and into the realm of business.
Second, I argue that the importance of early domestic passenger aviation—and,
in particular, the importance of Transcontinental Air Transport—has not been fully
appreciated. T.A.T. flew for only a year and was overshadowed in death by its larger and
more successful offspring, T.&W.A.3 But the history of T.A.T. offers critical insight into the
development of American passenger aviation. T.A.T. flew passengers, and only
passengers, at a time when almost all airlines shunned them.4 It survived without
government subsidy in a crowded boom marketplace characterized by high rates of

3

In Lindbergh's many biographies, for instance, T.A.T. is mentioned only as a passing note of interest
between his famous transatlantic flight in 1927 and the infamous kidnapping of his infant son in 1932. A.
Scott Berg's "Lindbergh," widely regarded as Lindbergh's definitive biography, is better than most,
although Berg devotes only four pages to Lindbergh's involvement with T.A.T. Other popular biographies
mention T.A.T. only once. See: Walter L. Hixson, Charles A. Lindbergh: Lone Eagle. (New York:
HarperCollins College Publishers, 1996.) 57. See also: James Cross Giblin, Charles A. Lindbergh: A
Human Hero. (New York: Clarion Books, 1997.) 100-101.
4

R. E. G. Davies, Airlines of the United States Since 1914. (London: Putnam, 1972.) 80.
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corporate mortality.5 Its organization predated government attempts to establish
passenger aviation by three years, and, because T.A.T. operated independent of
government subsidy, the actions of its directors followed the logic of the marketplace,
not that of government incentives.
Historians usually invoke federal airmail contracts to explain the development of
American aviation, and conventional histories date the rise of passenger aviation to the
1930 McNary-Watres Act. After the 1925 Kelly Act authorized the U.S. Post Office to
contract with private companies to transport airmail, the McNary-Watres Act turned
those contracts into policy instruments. It changed airmail payments so that they were
based on the amount of space an airplane left available for airmail, not the number of
pieces of airmail it carried. This new rate structure incentivized the operation of larger
airplanes, which, having more than one engine, tended also to be safer and more
reliable. Walter Folger Brown, the Postmaster General, granted additional bonuses to
airlines that carried passengers and that equipped their airplanes with radios and
navigation aids. Through financial incentives, the government hoped to encourage
passenger transport on larger, safer airplanes.6 The Watres Act, while hugely important
to the development of American aviation, tells only the story of passenger aviation as it
sprang from airmail. This focus has marginalized early passenger airlines like T.A.T.—
airlines that should be at the forefront of our interrogation of early passenger aviation.
By understanding how aviation started, we can better understand how it operates today.

5

Most early airlines "either gained mail contracts or went broke; out of 77 formed between 1925 and
1932, only 17... were still operating in January, 1931." See Ronald Miller and David Sawers, The
Technical Development of Modern Aviation. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968.) 17.
6

F. Robert van der Linden, Airlines and Air Mail: The Post Office and the Birth of the Commercial Aviation
Industry. (Lexington: UP of Kentucky, 2002.) See especially 1-61.
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Still, T.A.T.'s name hid logistical legerdemain. Although air travel offered
significant time savings over rail travel, aviation technology was not yet sufficiently
mature to permit night flying. T.A.T. solved this by flying its passengers during the day
and placing them on sleeper trains overnight, so that they could travel even while they
slept. The Pennsylvania Railroad, one of the airline's partners, promoted the airline as
offering "Two Days By Plane, Two Nights By Train."7 Rail was still king in the late 1920s,
but that was changing. The number of passenger miles flown by U.S. airlines more than
doubled between 1929 and 1930. Over the next thirty years, the number of passenger
miles traveled by air continued to climb, surpassing the number traveled by rail in 1958.8
While T.A.T. did not free itself or its passengers from the rule of the rails, the airline
stands as the first marker of this transition from rail travel to air, a hybrid creation that
existed halfway between each mode of transport. T.A.T. recapitulated this rail-air
transition even as it reproduced it.
This essay also engages with broader questions in the field of aviation history.
The field has developed significantly since 1989, when James Hansen called for
historians to move away from detail-oriented histories of technology and instead write
"broadly synthetic, contextual, and interdisciplinary studies [that] explore the meaning of
a particular field of history in terms of what it means to others."9 This essay builds on the
work of numerous authors who answered Hansen's call, including Joseph Corn, F.
Robert van der Linden, David Courtwright, and Daniel Rust, all of whom have argued
that the technology of aviation can only be fully understood in a social context. This

7

Pennsylvania Railroad, Two Days by Plane, Two Nights by Train, [1929]. MOF Hatfield, LEV-368.

8

Davies, Airlines, 667, 671.

9

James R. Hansen, "Aviation History in the Wider View," Technology and Culture 30 (July 1989). 643.
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shift, while important, is unfinished, and I hope that this essay furthers the
understanding of aviation as a technology intertwined with society and culture.
Third, I argue that the technology of aviation furthered Americans' understanding
of their country as a bounded national unit. Here, I build on the work of Benedict
Anderson and Alan Trachtenberg. Anderson argues that print capitalism made it
possible for people to understand themselves as members of large, interconnected
communities—that it allowed them to 'think the nation.'10 Trachtenberg argues that the
rise of the corporation in late 19th century America spurred social and cultural changes,
resulting in a society that was more national than local, more together than apart.11
Aviation advertisements traded in motifs of interconnection and incorporation,
presenting the idea of a national United States shrunk by the speed of the airplane. The
story of T.A.T. is partly a story about the power of technology to change how we see and
order our world. This point builds on the work of Wolfgang Schivelbusch and Joseph
Corn. Schivelbusch argues that the locomotive's ability to move faster than the speed of
nature cleaved apart notions of time and distance, simultaneously shrinking and
expanding the natural world.12 The airplane, which flew faster than a train could travel,
reproduced this change. Corn argues that Americans saw aviation as more than a
mechanical technology: They saw it as the harbinger of a bright future. The
transcendent nature of mechanical flight seemed to promise a new age of prosperity

10

Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. (New
York: Verso, 1999.) 22, 44-45.
11

Alan Trachtenberg, The Incorporation of America: Culture and Society in the Gilded Age. (New York: Hill
and Wang, 1982.) 3-10.
12

Wolfgang Schivelbusch, The Railway Journey: The Industrialization of Time and Space in the 19th
Century. (Berkeley, CA: University of California P, 1987.) 33-44.
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and peace, of unity and happiness.13 T.A.T. built partly on these feelings of airmindedness.
Finally, I argue that aviation had particular power in the developing American
West. Just over thirty years before Lindbergh flew across the Atlantic, Frederick Jackson
Turner cast his gaze towards the Pacific and heralded the close of the American frontier.
With the first word in its name, Transcontinental Air Transport broke with the regionallyfocussed airmail carriers that preceded it and instead took up the mantle of manifest
destiny that John O'Sullivan had knit nearly a century earlier.14 T.A.T. travelers bore west
from New York until they reached the golden terminus of Los Angeles, California, and
the bulk of the Transcontinental Air Transport route lay over the vast stretches of fields
and deserts west of the Mississippi River.
Transportation has been widely acknowledged as an essential component of
analysis for historians of the American West, but it is railroads and automobiles, not
airlines, that are largely credited with tying the West into eastern centers of capital and
culture and aiding the region's national integration.15 For western cities and towns,
aviation offered a future: An airport was, at once, a transportation link to other places,
an economic alternative to the rule of the rails, and proof that a town was up-to-date.
13

Joseph J. Corn, The Winged Gospel: America's Romance with Aviation, 1900-1950. (New York: Oxford
UP, 1983.) 4-12.
14

John L. O'Sullivan, "Annexation," The United States Magazine and Democratic Review 17 (July 1845):
5–10. O'Sullivan defended annexing Texas by declaring that it was America's "manifest destiny to
overspread the continent allotted by Providence for the free development of our yearly multiplying
millions." 'Manifest destiny' became the belief that America was fated to expand across the continent to
the Pacific Ocean.
15

On railroads, see Carlos A. Schwantes and James P. Ronda, The West the Railroads Made. (Seattle:
University of Washington P, 2008.) On railroads and automobiles, see Marguerite S. Shaffer, See America
First: Tourism and National Identity, 1880-1940. (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution P, 2001.) See
also: Carlos A. Schwantes, Going Places: Transportation Redefines the Twentieth-Century West.
(Bloomington: Indiana UP, 2003.) Schwantes briefly mentions the role of air transportation in the American
West.
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Regional aviation joined ranches to small Western cities and towns, such towns to each
other, and also to the rest of the nation. Then, during World War II, the aerospace
industry and the migrants it pulled west reshaped the economy and culture of the West
Coast. Over the past half-century, numerous regional airlines have been founded with
an exclusive focus on the West, some of which have leapt to the national fore:
Southwest Airlines, Northwest Airlines, Air California, Alaska Airlines, Frontier Airlines.
The twentieth century West is as much a product of the airplane as it is of the railroad or
the automobile.
Aviation, as both technology and social force, offered a way to incorporate the
cities and people of the distant West into the Eastern United States. T.A.T. marks the
beginning of that moment.
–––––––––––––––––––
Transcontinental Air Transport has an important place in American history, sitting
as it does at the juncture of aviation history and the history of the American West. The
story of T.A.T. is well-documented in its own promotional circulars and internal
memoranda; in the correspondence of its president, Clement Keys; and in the
correspondence of Charles Lindbergh, chair of its technical committee. Over five
chapters, this essay follows the chronological story of the Transcontinental Air
Transport, from its founding through its construction and operation to the forced merger
that ended its existence.
Chapter 1 charts the development of aviation in America, from the Wright
Brothers' 1903 flight at Kitty Hawk to Lindbergh's 1927 landing in Paris. These events
and others like them spurred a widespread "air-mindedness" about the potential of air
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travel in the American public. Despite this enthusiasm, aviation still smacked of danger:
The sky was the realm of daredevils and barnstormers in unreliable contraptions.
Lindbergh represented a counterpoint to these daredevils: He was seen as daring, but
never risky, and promoted aviation as a safe, modern technology. To understand T.A.T.,
we must first understand the world from which it emerged.
Chapter 2 discusses the airline's founding. Keys sought to harness Americans'
air-mindedness and translate it into reality. His correspondence, private writings, and
memoranda offer insight into how he thought about a national, transcontinental
passenger airline at a time when airlines were small, local, and directed at carrying mail.
From the beginning, Keys sought to build broad support for passenger aviation by
recruiting trusted public figures. He persuaded Charles Lindbergh to join the venture,
and the directors that Keys brought together to serve on the airline's board came from
diverse backgrounds—different industries, different cities.
Chapter 3 chronicles the construction of T.A.T. Facing a nation with few airports
and little infrastructure for national air travel, T.A.T. built the infrastructure necessary for
its activities almost entirely from scratch. Simultaneously, T.A.T. strove to build a mental
infrastructure, a new way for the American public to understand air travel. The
construction of the air route is inextricable from the construction of the airline's public
image. Each process supported the other: Passengers would not fly along an unsafe
route, so the airline took extra steps to make its operation safer than those of airmail
lines. In national reach, logistical complexity, and technological requirements, this
undertaking had precedent only in the late 19th-century construction of the
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transcontinental railroads. It took more than a year of this work before the airline was
prepared to fly passengers.
Chapter 4 follows the rise and fall of the airline's fortunes. The 48-hourcelebration that marked the start of passenger service in July of 1929 was, in many
ways, the high point of the airline's short life. The promotional shine quickly faded. The
airline failed to attract as many passengers as Keys had hoped it would and its planes
routinely flew half-empty. The crash of a T.A.T. plane in September dampened
passenger demand, as did the stock market crash in October of 1929. By the end of its
first year, T.A.T. was losing money on every flight, and its financial position was no
longer sustainable.
Chapter 5, the essay's coda, discusses the airline's end and its legacy. For many
Americans, the nature of air travel—the airplane's speed and altitude above the Earth—
made the country feel smaller. T.A.T.'s transcontinental reach was especially important
in the West, where air travel put the cities and destinations of the West within reach of
Eastern businessmen and tourists. These ideas—incorporation, interconnection—each
outlasted the airline and appeared in aviation advertisements again and again over the
following two decades.
Over the first half of the twentieth century, the duration of a transcontinental
journey shrank ever-shorter: It took forty-eight hours to cross the country, then thirty-six,
twenty, thirteen, ten. In the 1960s, the introduction of commercial jet travel shrunk the
country yet again, shortening transcontinental flights to five hours.16 But even as
Lindbergh's button summoned the future, it recalled the past. Sixty years before he

16

Davies, Airlines, 670.
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pushed it, in 1869, two crews from the Union Pacific and Central Pacific railroads met in
the Utah desert to drive the final spike of the first transcontinental railroad, uniting the
country as it had never been united before.17
Lindbergh's button, sitting as it does between these moments, contained the
seeds of the future, harvested from the dreams of the past. With its depression, a new,
smaller, faster world was created. We live today in the shadow of that moment, in a
world birthed from a button.

17

"The Pacific Railroad," The New York Times, 12 May 1869: 1. ProQuest Historical Newspapers The
New York Times (1851-2006), 02 Apr. 2010.
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1. The Rise of Airmindedness, or: "First within the continents."
A Scotchman and his wife were spending a vacation at the shore near an aviation field.
One day the couple went over to the field and asked: "How mooch do you charge for the
ride?" "Fifteen apiece [$200 apiece] for ten minutes," was the reply.
After much arguing they reached an agreement: should the passengers speak even once
during the trip the fare would be fifty dollars [$650]; if they kept silent, it would be free.
The couple got in and were soon in the air. Up they went to ten thousand feet then came
a loop-the-loop—and not a word. A vertical bank, a tail slip and a nose dive brought no
sound.
In despair, the pilot landed and said to the Scotchman, "Well, you win." "But there was
once when I nearly spoke," replied the passenger. "When was that?" was the question.
"When my wife dropped out."
— "The Price He Paid," Harper's Monthly Magazine, 1922 18
It is a hard, cold, calculating job to turn the air into a medium of commerce.
— C. M. Keys, on the prospects of commercial aviation in the United States, 1925 19

In 1903, on a sandy barrier island off the coast of North Carolina, two brothers
flung an improbable invention into the air, where it wobbled, steadied, and supported
itself and its cargo on nothing at all. The Wright Flyer soared over the dunes of Kitty
Hawk for twelve long seconds before it fell back to the earth, in a flight that proved the
feasibility of manned heavier-than-air flying craft and opened a new frontier of
exploration: the sky.
Over the next two decades, the technology that the Wright brothers midwifed at
Kitty Hawk was developed and advanced by countless inventors and boosters. It quickly
found a place in the national consciousness.20 But aviation was seen as the realm of
risk-takers, barnstormers, daredevils: An extreme sport not appropriate for the general
public. This was the world before Transcontinental Air Transport. Investors like C. M.
18

"The Price He Paid," Harper's Monthly Magazine, Dec. 1922: 134. http://harpers.org/archive/, 22 Feb.
2010. Prices in this essay have been translated into 2010 dollars using the inflation calculator offered by
the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. The equivalent prices are presented in parenthesis or brackets. See:
http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl.
19
20

Clement M. Keys, memo to The Independent, 03/05/1926. NASM Keys, box 22, folder 5.

The story of early American aviation has been told by many people and in many places. This section
endeavors not to recapitulate their work, but to briefly summarize the decades before Lindbergh's flight.
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Keys and Daniel Guggenheim sought to tilt aviation away from spectacle and towards
reliable use, but it was Charles Lindbergh who, with an improbable flight across three
thousand miles of ocean, demonstrated the potential of aviation to connect distant
places and ignited a new fascination with the technology of flight. Lindbergh's national
air tour the following year introduced Americans to a new, safer, domesticated version of
flight and opened the door to passenger aviation. This chapter traces the interplay
between aviation's technological and social sides and follows the arc from danger to
domestication.
The Wrights' accomplishment seemed so wildly impossible that it was at first
disbelieved.21 They sent news of their accomplishment—four flights that day, the last
and longest of which was nearly a minute—to their parents in Dayton, Ohio. Their
parents were were thrilled. The newspapers yawned. The telegraph editor at one of the
Dayton papers breezily dismissed the flight. "Fifty-seven seconds, hey? If it had been
fifty-seven minutes then it might have been a news item."22 The public proof came five
years later, in 1908, in front of a crowd of Army officers and newspapermen on a parade
ground outside of Washington, DC. "When the plane first rose, the crowd's gasp of
astonishment was not alone at the wonder of it," wrote Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., in a
report to his father, President Roosevelt, "but because it was so unexpected."23 The
following year, The Wright Company was founded, and the brothers turned to building
and selling airplanes.

21

Fred C. Kelly, The Wright Brothers. (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1943.) 116. Scientists
and physicists, notably Simon Newcomb, had published numerous articles in the popular media proving
that heavier-than-air flight was impossible, as it violated the laws of physics.
22

Qtd. in Kelly, Wright Brothers, 107

23

Qtd. in Kelly, Wright Brothers, 227.
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Entrepreneurs were quick to latch on to aviation's commercial potential. In 1911,
three years after the Wrights' public demonstration, a pilot named Cal Rodgers set out
on the first transcontinental flight. Rodgers' flight was a corporate gimmick sponsored by
the Armour Meat Packing Company of Chicago and the plane was named the Vin Fiz
Flyer after the company's new grape soft drink. It took Rodgers 49 days to travel the
four thousand miles between New York and Los Angeles. Thousands of Americans
gathered to see Rodgers and his airplane at each of his more than 70 stops, and the
flight made him a national celebrity, but there was little practical about his trip. The Flyer
was slow, dangerous, and unreliable—no challenge to the trains that took a mere week
to cross the country.24
The airplane's military potential was realized during World War I. Airplanes were
unique in their ability to pierce the dark clouds of war that loomed over Europe in 1914,
giving commanders and tacticians new views of battlefields and offering new methods
of attack. The demands of warfare incubated aviation technology, encouraging the
development of faster, more powerful, and more reliable airplanes; the war also swelled
the ranks of trained pilots. Following the armistice in 1918, American airfields were
flooded with war-surplus airplanes. Many freshly discharged pilots turned to
barnstorming. Barnstormers performed mock dogfights and aerial stunts, but also
offered short rides—five dollars for five minutes, giving people the chance to see their
hometown from the air or just to experience flight. Each short ride built up public airmindedness, passenger by passenger.25
24

Daniel L. Rust, Flying Across America: The Airline Passenger Experience. (Norman, OK: University of
Oklahoma P, 2009.) 5-7
25

David T. Courtwright, Sky as Frontier: Adventure, Aviation, and Empire. (College Station, TX: Texas
A&M UP, 2005.) 39-50. For more on WWI and on barnstormers, see chapter 3, "Gone West."
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The first enduring practical use for aviation was airmail. After a series of
experimental runs, the U.S. Post Office launched America's first regular airmail service
in 1918. In Airlines and Air Mail, historian F. Robert van der Linden argues that
"American commercial aviation was largely the creation of the federal government,"
which indirectly subsidized the fledgling industry through airmail contracts offered by the
Post Office. The Post Office invested public funds in aviation in the interest of improving
its service, particularly the speed of the mail. In 1919, recognizing that the "time savings
afforded by the speed of aircraft could be realized only over long distances," the Post
Office opened an airmail route between New York and Chicago. By 1920, the airmail
route bridged the continent, connecting San Francisco and New York. By 1925, the Air
Mail Service was "a flourishing government enterprise... proving every day and night
that aviation was no longer the realm of the foolhardy, but a viable, though still infant,
industry."26 Airmail was a sober counterweight to the spectacle of barnstormers and
offered a permanence that they lacked.
Whether practical or spectacular, the seeming miracle of flight captured the
public imagination. "What more astounding romance could there be than the story of
Icarus' dream and Leonardo's patient diagrams, and then that triumphant leap into the
air by the modest and undiscourageable Wrights?" asked Harper's Monthly Magazine in
1926. "It is as a symbol of persistent human will that the airplane has its highest
meaning for us; long chained, like Prometheus, to the earth, we have freed ourselves at
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last, and now we can look the skylark in the face."27 To understand flight was to see the
world in a new way, a perspective termed air-mindedness.
Air-mindedness emerged from the awe people felt when they first saw
demonstrations of heavier-than-air flight: "Airplane flight was 'miraculous,' 'inhuman,'
'occult,' or most commonly a 'miracle.'" To be air-minded "meant having enthusiasm for
airplanes, believing in their potential to better human life, and supporting aviation
development," writes historian Joseph Corn in The Winged Gospel, his history of airmindedness.28 While the air-minded could attend air shows, follow Rodgers' flight, send
letters by airmail—even go up for a short ride themselves—it was rare that they used
traveled as passengers aboard airplanes. The essential contradiction of early aviation is
that even while everyone, it seems, wanted to fly, relatively few people actually flew. As
historian Robert Wohl has written:
In comparison with other technologies, such as electricity, the telephone, the automobile,
the cinema, or the radio, the airplane had little or no immediate or direct impact on the
way that most people lived their lives; yet its invention nonetheless inspired an
extraordinary outpouring of feeling and gave rise to utopian hopes or gnawing fears.29

Public feelings towards early aviation resembled contemporary feelings towards space
flight: Each flight was a thrilling yet distant prospect and something one was unlikely to
experience personally. The technology seemed limitless and each new aviation
success, each novel use, reinforced popular beliefs in air-mindedness. In the spring of
1927, a lone airmail pilot, with a single flight, caught Americans' attention and caused
interest in aviation to climb even higher.
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Charles Lindbergh took off from a Long Island airfield on May 20, 1927, to
attempt a transatlantic flight. Like so many Americans, Lindbergh was air-minded: He
believed that airplanes could carry more than airmail and his flight was partly inspired,
he later wrote, by his desire to establish aviation "as a common means of transport."30
During the flight, he wrote, he came to see his airplane as "a lens focused on the future,
a forerunner of the mechanisms that would conquer time and space." Eventually,
Lindbergh believed, the airline would come to replace the railroad.31 Lindbergh
succeeded in his attempt: Thirty-three-and-a-half hours after he took off from Long
Island, the wheels of the Spirit of St. Louis bumped down on French soil at Le Bourget
Airport, just outside of Paris. "Lindbergh Does It!" blared The New York Times in a threeline banner headline across its front page (see Figure 2).32 "American Eagle Swoops
Down From Inky Sky," read the front page of The Atlanta Constitution.33 The excitement
was palpable: Lindbergh was catapulted into the public eye and his name, life story, and
deeds became instantly familiar to almost every American. Constant radio, newspaper,
and film coverage made Lindbergh the best-known American of the late 1920s—the
country's first media darling.
In order to make the most of the aviation frenzy that Lindbergh ignited, the
Guggenheim Fund asked him to undertake a three-month-long national air tour "for the
primary purpose of stimulating popular interest in the use of air transport." The
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Guggenheim Fund was a not-for-profit investment fund whose goal was "to make our
people air-minded and to demonstrate that flight could be and was a safe, practical
method of transportation, that pilots could adhere to schedules and that distance could
be divorced from time." Interest in Lindbergh's flight, the fund's trustees hoped, would
stimulate the use of air services such as airmail or aerial photography, directly
supporting the industry, and that it would translate into support for airport construction.34
Lindbergh spent his aerial tour trying "to convince everyone who would listen that
aviation had a brilliant future."35 Everyone did: Americans turned out in droves. Most
Americans lived within fifty miles of his route; one-quarter of the American population—
an unprecedented thirty million people—saw him in person.36 Lindbergh flew the Spirit
of St. Louis, the same plane he had taken across the Atlantic, more than 22,350 miles,
stopping at 82 cities and delivering 147 speeches.37
If earlier iterations of air-mindedness built on vague utopianism, Lindbergh turned
air-mindedness upside down by demonstrating aviation's concrete uses. As The New
York Times wrote a year after his transatlantic flight, "when the excitement had died
down a stark fact remained—the airplane had been proved as a practical means of
communication over long distances."38 This use was bound up in the very structure of
Lindbergh's tour as he hopped from town to town. He gave speeches, dedicated
airports, and allowed Americans to bask in his celebrity, then zipped to the next town or
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city to repeat the process. The only way he could visit the entire country was by air.
Lindbergh wasn't just painting an image of the future—he was living it.
Air-mindedness was a national phenomenon, a fact that Lindbergh's tour threw
into sharp relief. He was a constant media presence after his transatlantic flight and his
actions, no matter how small or quotidian, were recounted in newspapers, in
magazines, in newsreels, making him a household name and a national brand. To share
in his celebrity was to share in a national experience, similar to that of print capitalism.
Benedict Anderson has written: "These fellow-readers, to whom they were connected
through print, formed, in their secular, particular, visible invisibility, the embryo the
nationally imagined community."39 Now, fellow-participators could be connected to each
other through national celebrities like Lindbergh, growing the embryo and reinforcing the
idea of a nationally imagined community.
From this national platform, Lindbergh pushed Americans to build new airports or
improve existing ones. While his tour had overtones of nationalism, his message was
solidly local. Domestic infrastructure, he contended, would be key to the development of
aviation. "It seemed obvious to me," Lindbergh wrote decades later, "that the
development of airlines would be made in three stages. First within the continents; then
between the continents; finally across the oceans from hemisphere to hemisphere."40
He had become famous for flying across an ocean, yes, but if aviation was to benefit
Americans, it had to be local and accessible: It had to start in their backyards and grow
up from there. "I believe," Lindbergh wrote, "that the best way to promote aeronautics in
a given locality is to establish a well-equipped airport. The city will then be visited
39
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frequently by aircraft, thus allowing its citizens to become accustomed to the sight and
performance of these modern means of transport."41 As people gained personal
experience with aircraft, Lindbergh believed, they would become more comfortable with
them, even comfortable enough to fly. The technology would seem less distant and
more domestic.
An airport could also connect a city to the rest of the nation—and to new
economic opportunities. "Any city can work wonders with respect to its transportation
problem," Lindbergh wrote, "by merely establishing an airport and using airplane
services wherever possible." By delicately alluding to the 'transportation problem,'
Lindbergh acknowledged the predicament faced by so many towns across the West: A
western town's fortunes depended on its access to the railroad.42 For many towns,
being consigned to a branch line meant diminished fortunes; being bypassed by the
railroad meant almost certain death.
In St. Louis, Lindbergh's hometown, the call for airports resonated. City leaders,
perhaps still smarting from Chicago's victory in the 1850s to be the railroad hub for the
West, "felt that the city must provide the facilities for an efficient air service if it is to be
prominently placed on the map of aerial routes such as are certain to be designated
within the near future," wrote The New York Times in 1928, a year after Lindbergh's
transatlantic flight. Citizens in St. Louis believed that in order to maintain their economic
dominance as a city of trade and a "gateway to the west and southwest," it was
necessary to fully commit to the technology of flight. The construction of an airport was
a duty of the municipality, carried out in its mission of civic promotion. Within a year,
41
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these citizens hoped, "air lines for passengers, mail, freight, and express will radiate
from this city, supplementing, if not supplanting, the rail lines that now connect St. Louis
with other parts of the country."43 An airport, literally and cartographically, would connect
St. Louis to the rest of the America. By "supplanting" rail, it could also connect the city to
the future.44
At St. Louis and in cities and towns across the country, Americans heeded
Lindbergh's call for airports. By 1931, America had twice as many airports and landing
fields as it did before his tour. A third of these were lighted, permitting operations at
night. Moreover, by his very presence, Lindbergh changed how people regarded their
local airports. He personified a new kind of aviation, one that was modern, safe, and
reliable. (The way he carefully and methodically planned for his transatlantic flight had
been widely reported, and Lindbergh, while daring, was not seen as a taker of
unnecessary risks.) Local airports, long the realm of daredevils and wing-walkers, came
to be seen as "gateways to a prosperous future."45 Americans flocked to these
gateways: 1928 saw a 300% increase in applications for pilots' licenses and a 400%
increase in the number of licensed aircraft.46
At the same time, Lindbergh’s tour changed how he saw his country. It filled out
his mental map of America with images of real, discrete places and gave him a way to
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weave unique local threads into a bolt of national cloth.47 At the conclusion of his tour,
Lindbergh wrote, "the United States was represented by a new image in my mind.
Instead of outlines on a paper map, I saw New England's valleys dotted by white
villages, the crystal waters of Michigan's great lakes, Arizona's pastel deserts, Georgia's
red cotton fields, the cascades and deep forests of the Oregon Northwest."48 The
airplane's altitude positioned Lindbergh to see these places, but it was his geographic
literacy that enabled him to understand and describe them.49 Geographic literacy was
newly common among Americans. As historian Susan Schulten notes, "The early
twentieth century brought a slow and steady stream of Americans into contact with
maps and atlases. Geography was gradually becoming not just a school subject or a
reference tool, but a cultural commodity as well."50 Americans followed the battles of
World War I in atlases. They used gas station maps to navigate on road trips. Maps
were especially handy for following record-breaking airplane flights, like Lindbergh's
flight across the Atlantic or Admiral Richard Byrd's flight over the North Pole. Geography
was doubly linked to air-mindedness: First, through the near-cartographic perspective of
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an airplane's altitude, where, from above, the land looked like a map. And second, the
airplane re-oriented popular understandings of space and distance. To fly was to be
loosed from geography: For the first time, it was possible to travel as the crow flies.
After his tour, it seemed as if aviation and Lindbergh were one and the same, so
that to speak of a world made by air travel was to speak of a world made by Lindbergh
himself, swept up and carried in his arms. Although Lindbergh was in many ways the
father of American passenger aviation, although he opened the skies and called forth a
new world, it is more accurate to see him as a fulcrum, a spark, a catalyst for the
energetic acceptance of flight and a central lens that focussed the raw enthusiasm of
the American public. He was heir to a broad social and technological legacy that began
with the Wright Brothers at Kitty Hawk, developed at the nation's air shows and on
flights like that of the Vin Fiz, matured in the skies above Europe and along airmail
routes, and was nudged along by financial backers like the Guggenheim Fund.
Lindbergh did what pilots do: He flew. But he did not fly alone.
On April 30, 1928, at the conclusion of his national tour, Lindbergh retired the
Spirit of St. Louis, donating the airplane to the Smithsonian Institution.51 He had flown
the airplane across an ocean and all over the country and it had been his companion for
just over a year. When he left his plane in Washington, DC, he left also the idea that
aviation was for aviators, lone men and women flying through the night in open-cockpit
wood-and-fabric constructions. The airplanes of the future would carry a different type of
men and women: passengers. Lindbergh had demonstrated that an airplane could be
useful, that it could be flown without inordinate risk, and then brought his famous plane
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to the hometowns of millions of Americans—close enough to touch. In a way, Lindbergh
brought aviation down to earth. And on the ground was exactly where C. M. Keys,
aviation magnate, thought the industry should be.
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2. The Creation of an Airline, or: "90% of aviation is on the ground."
The building is probably so full of presidents that the novelty has worn off for the elevator
boys. We doubt if they are much thrilled by C. M. Keys, a slight, quiet man who has
offices on the fifteenth floor and who is president of a number of things, including the
Curtiss Aircraft Corporation and, more recently, the corporation which plans to get
travelers from here to Los Angeles in forty-eight hours by a series of plane and train
rides. Mr. Keys looks like a teacher and, oddly enough, used to be one.
– The New Yorker's Talk of the Town, June 16, 1928 52
I am firmly convinced that the evolution of passenger transport will not follow exactly the
course followed in the case of the airmail.
– Clement Keys, February 1929 53

Clement Keys believed that passengers were the future of the aviation industry.
He was one of the few that did. The established airlines shunned passengers, viewing
them as more expensive and more difficult to transport than airmail. Keys took a
different tack. It was only a matter of time before some entrepreneur sought to capitalize
on this gap in the marketplace, so why not him? He proceeded methodically, putting
together a new company piece by piece. "90% of aviation is on the ground," he was
fond of saying. Keys recruited Charles Lindbergh, brought together a diverse and
talented board of directors, and raised millions of dollars in capital. (For images of Keys
and Lindbergh, see Figure 1.) The company, Transcontinental Air Transport, was an
experiment—an expertly prepared, well-financed experiment, but an experiment
nonetheless. Keys' correspondence, speeches, and memoranda offer a window into the
airline's founding. To look back at his early thoughts on T.A.T. is to see the world as he
saw it and to understand aviation as he did.
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Keys was born in Canada in 1876 and attended the University of Toronto. He
graduated in 1897 at the age of 21 and briefly taught classics; in 1901, he moved to
New York City and became a reporter for The Wall Street Journal.54 In 1903, he became
the Journal's railroad editor, and developed an affinity for the "well-organized, vertically
integrated, railroad-holding companies," whose directors he saw as "true industry
pioneers who built huge, well-run enterprises that benefited the economy and served
the public interest."55 In 1905, he became the financial editor for World's Work, a
monthly magazine that celebrated American life and "the cheerful spirit of men who do
things."56 He stayed with the magazine until 1911, when he founded his own investment
consulting firm, C. M. Keys & Company. Through his work there, he developed
connections with many of Wall Street's prominent financiers.
Keys caught the aviation bug in 1919, when he traveled to Europe with the
American Aviation Commission to examine the state of European aviation in the wake of
World War I. As a financier, he had revived the Curtiss Aeroplane and Motor Company;
on his return to the United States, Keys purchased a controlling interest in Curtiss and
brought the company back to profitability. He made the cause of aviation his own and
aimed to emulate the organizational and managerial strategies of his beloved railroads
by applying their methods to the fledgling aviation industry.57 By 1927, Keys sat at the
center of a small empire built of interrelated, vertically-integrated aviation businesses, all
of which he headed or controlled. A list prepared in 1930 of Keys's corporate
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involvement listed 26 companies, involved in areas as diverse as aviation finance,
import/export, pilot training, airplane design and construction, airmail delivery, and the
construction of gyroscopes.58
Keys was forward-looking in the way that businessmen often are: To profit from
the future, you must first predict it. He staked his claim on aviation in 1925 with the
unequivocal statement that "organized commercial aviation will win." In that year, he
looked ahead, as if from the cockpit of an airplane, and predicted that:
The scattered individual flyers who have been making a living will probably diminish as
the supply of cheap war equipment disappears from the market. Organized transportation
companies will take their place. It will take a year or two of organized flying to determine
at what rates and under what conditions, year in and year out, the movement of traffic
can be maintained profitably. This determination involves the use of a lot of experimental
equipment, the training of men and the establishment of efficient and cheap terminal
services. It is my judgement, which I have backed with capital, that the verdict at the end
of a year or two will be that the thing can be done.59

This was a strong statement in 1925, when aviation seemed a trifle and there were
three commercial operators in the entire country.60 But Keys took a long view and saw
aviation not for what it was, but for what it could be. He doubted that organized aviation
would be an immediate success, but if carefully planned and properly run, an airline
might be able to succeed. It is especially significant that Keys—a financier, well-versed
in risk—would note that he had backed these opinions with capital. He was not merely
musing on the possibilities of aviation, but making a case for a new industry.
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What might this industry look like? The success of aviation, Keys wrote, "turns
upon the ability to transport safely over long distances, in all kinds of weather, by day or
by night, the tonnage that is available, at a cost that is not prohibitive."61 This set of
criteria—so familiar to the contemporary pilot or passenger that they typically go without
notice—reveal Keys to be a visionary. Before 1925, the commercial aviation industry
was loosely organized and poorly regulated, composed largely of itinerant barnstormers
in small, aging planes. They didn't fly long distances, avoided weather and darkness,
and flew for show, not transport. The 1925 Kelly Act allowed the government to contract
airmail services with private operators, and its passage caused a scramble to organize
proper airlines flying modern equipment over fixed routes. The airmail lines were
occasionally stymied by weather or darkness and their planes only needed to be safe
enough that a single pilot could bail out before a crash. This was an inefficient approach
and one that did not scale well to flying passengers. (Proposals that passengers be
equipped with individual parachute were ultimately deemed unfeasible.) Airplanes would
have to be made safer and more reliable if aviation was to be a consumer industry.
Keys's emphasis on affordability is especially revealing. He took a realistic view
of air-mindedness. "Patriotism on the part of the public—in the form of a desire to see
lots of airplanes flying in the United States—helps the promoter to promote," he wrote,
"but it soon fades when it has to take the form of paying for service that does not pay
the patriot in dollars and cents."62 Awe, in other words, didn't pay the bills, and aviation
would have to be affordable if it were to succeed. Keys approached the question of cost
as a businessman, not an engineer, by asking what consumers would pay for, not what
61
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was possible. He may have been able to win passengers' confidence, but he would also
have to win their wallets. Keys's criteria—safety, reliability, affordability—were tall
demands, beyond the limits of aviation technology in 1925. Still, they would be his
watchwords, and they would guide his thinking as he organized his aviation dealings.
If Keys was right, if airplanes became safer and more reliable and travel became
more affordable, then he foresaw a bright future for aviation.
If this conclusion is correct the real establishment of commercial aviation in the United
States will take place about the year 1928. From that date its growth will be very rapid, for
there is never any lack of capital, of men, or of material in the United States to carry
forward any branch of transportation after the initial process of study and experiment has
demonstrated its commercial feasibility. In that case it would be practically assured that
within a reasonable time the United States will take its proper place among the air
minded nations — and that, after all, is the thing we are striving at.63

Keys's view was informed by history: The railroad and the automobile, both of which
had begun as awkward, experimental technologies, quickly developed into large, multimillion dollar consumer industries. If the uses of the airplane could be riddled out and
demonstrated, Keys believed, then business and capital would follow. Despite his
cautions and caveats, Keys was air-minded. He had become an American citizen in
1924 and believed that airplanes would change the country for the better. An airplane
was, in some sense, more than just a technology or a business opportunity, it was a
way to prove the ascendancy of the United States to the rest of the world.
His suggestion of the year 1928 would prove prescient. Although Keys didn't yet
know it, that was the year he would found a transcontinental passenger airline. It was
something he had been considering for a long time. As early as 1925, Keys seemed to
be thinking both about a transcontinental airline and about launching passenger service.
After the 1925 Kelly Act provided for the transportation of airmail by Post Office
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contractors, Keys founded National Air Transport, an airmail line, to bid for the New
York-Chicago contract.64 At the same time, N.A.T. courted Western Air Express, which
was bidding for the Chicago-San Francisco airmail contract, in the hopes that the two
airlines could together enter a joint bid for the entire transcontinental route. Western's
president declined the offer.65 But the tantalizing idea of a transcontinental passenger
airline reappeared in 1926, when executives at the Pennsylvania Railroad approached
Keys and N.A.T. with a proposal for a New York-Los Angeles air-rail line. Nothing seems
to have come of that, either.66 Regardless of when or where the idea originated, the
essential thing is this: For a man like Keys, steeped in the world of aviation, the next,
unrealized step must have been to link the coasts.67 On passenger aviation, Keys wrote:
"I believe that, while passenger transportation is still purely experimental and cannot be
regarded as anything but that, it will arrive in time."68 That time, he knew, was coming.
Could a transcontinental passenger airline be far off? It was in this state of mind that
Keys regarded Lindbergh's famous 1927 flight.
As the world buzzed with news of Lindbergh's transatlantic triumph, Keys
composed a letter to the young aviator, offering him a role, any role, in the creation of
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"the first great passenger trunk line of the country."69 Keys, a former newspaperman,
knew a good story when he saw one: Lindbergh was young, dashing, and had just
become the face of aviation. Lindbergh had incredible name recognition and, Keys
realized, could easily parlay his celebrity into a brand. Thus, it was important to Keys
that Lindbergh be actively and centrally involved in the airline. Keys offered him "the
Presidency or any official position which you may choose," at a salary of Lindbergh's
choosing, with a board of directors of his composition, for an airline with his name on it:
"Lindbergh National Lines, or some similar name to suit your wishes." Keys and his
partners would "underwrite all of the capital that is necessary to carry on this
enterprise."70 The letter is dated June 14, 1927, the day after Lindbergh was received in
New York City with a ticker-tape parade in celebration of his transatlantic flight.71
Lindbergh, awash in similar offers and requests for endorsement, did not respond to the
letter. He may have been overwhelmed; he may not have been interested; he may not
have taken the offer seriously. But Keys was interested, and Keys took Lindbergh
seriously.
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Further, Lindbergh's involvement in the airline from its beginning substantially changes our understanding
of T.A.T.'s relationship with the public, as I argue in my next chapter.
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Two weeks later, Keys's lawyer, Chester Cuthell, reiterated the offer in a second
letter to Lindbergh.72 Lindbergh telephoned Cuthell on July 14 to decline the offer, but
he soon reconsidered and telephoned again on July 26 to talk further. The next day, in
response to Lindbergh's concerns and after conferring with some of Keys's advisors,
Cuthell sent Lindbergh a third letter, outlining a greatly revised plan for the company.
In the final schema, Lindbergh's managerial role in the company was greatly
reduced, a recognition, Cuthell wrote, that the earlier proposals "would not be attractive
to you because they would confine you too closely to the detailed task of operating a
regular service."73 Instead of an executive position, Lindbergh would focus on two
things: choosing equipment and studying possible routes.74 Both involved flying. Where
before Keys and his cohort had sought to tempt Lindbergh with fame and wealth, they
here took the opposite tack, offering him freedom to define his own place in the
company. Cuthell assured Lindbergh that his position
would not tie you down to desk work or even the details of operations; that your work
would be of a free lance character; it would be based primarily on development of new
ideas and that you could bring into the organization whatever men you want to help you,
either financially or personally.75

This was a quick—and clever—pivot from one offer to another, and Keys's willingness to
accommodate Lindbergh's desires suggests how badly he wanted Lindbergh involved in
the venture. Ultimately, Lindbergh "accepted an appointment as Chairman of the
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Technical Committee of the Transcontinental Air Transport in charge of all technical
details."76 The position allowed him wide latitude and real power to shape the airline—it
was no sinecure—and did not restrict ability to promote the general cause of aviation.
Despite his celebrity, Lindbergh remained an airmail pilot thrust into the public
eye by an improbable flight. He wore this fame heavily, doling it out a bit at a time,
always to promote aviation. In a brief press release, he explained his reason for joining
T.A.T.: "I believe the next important step in the progress of American aviation will be the
inauguration of extensive passenger transportation, consequently, I have become
actively identified with the Transcontinental Air Transport."77 Lindbergh hoped, he wrote
years later, that a world interconnected by aviation would "increase human freedom
[and] bring the peoples of the world together in understanding and peace. What could
advance civilized progress more rapidly than fast communication?"78 Lindbergh did not
rush into Keys's corporate arms. Before he joined T.A.T.—and it is one of the very few
organizations he did join after his transatlantic flight—he had to be convinced that the
move would somehow benefit aviation. Keys, for his part, regarded Lindbergh's
involvement as a coup: "He is proud of having signed up Lindbergh and likes to talk
about it," wrote The New Yorker.79 Ultimately, both parties came away satisfied:
Lindbergh gained a job that would have a real impact on the development of aviation,
and Keys gained a new figurehead for his airline. Important though Lindbergh was, the
young pilot was just one piece in Keys's larger plan.
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After securing Lindbergh's involvement, Keys and his associates spent the first
few months of 1928 bringing together a board of directors.80 Each man they recruited to
serve on the board—and the directors were all men—was chosen for a specific reason.
The board was large and diverse, with 21 notable men drawn from many different
sectors of American commercial life. Representatives of the Pennsylvania Railroad,
Fred Harvey, and The Ford Motor Company all sat on the board, as did Lindbergh's
backers. The board also included officers and directors of Keys's other corporations.
Keys took the position of president.81 By examining the composition of the board we can
better understand Keys's business strategies and the underpinnings of T.A.T.
General William W. Atterbury, president of the Pennsylvania Railroad, had
recently declared that the Pennsylvania would no longer be a railroad company but
instead a comprehensive transportation provider.82 Atterbury saw in T.A.T. the potential
to extend his railroad's reach past St. Louis, its western terminus, as well as the
possibility to ally his railroad with the new technology of flight. The Pennsylvania
Railroad purchased a 20% stake in T.A.T.83 and two men from the Pennsylvania sat on
the board: Daniel M. Sheaffer, chief of passenger transportation, and Julien L.
Eysmans, vice-president in charge of traffic.84 The Atcheson, Topeka, and Santa Fe
Railway, T.A.T.'s transportation partner in the western half of the country, declined to
invest in the airline; its directors were concerned that supporting alternative forms of
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transportation would be a conflict of interest.85 (The Santa Fe Railway was not
represented on T.A.T.'s board.) But the involvement of the Pennsylvania Railroad and
the Santa Fe Railway demonstrated that other transportation companies took T.A.T.
seriously, suggesting that passengers should too. "The big transportation systems with
their huge investments of capital do not rush into new schemes with enthusiasm," wrote
The San Francisco Chronicle. Their participation meant that passenger aviation had
"reached a substantial point in development and has come to stay."86
Lindbergh's transatlantic flight had been underwritten by three men: Harold Bixby,
Henry Breckinridge, and Harry Knight, all of St. Louis. Lindbergh did not join the board
—he was not interested in administration—but his three backers did. They brought with
them backgrounds in law and investment banking. They were also wealthy members of
the St. Louis social elite and their association with the venture added a certain luster.
Men of means chose their investments carefully: If Lindbergh's financial backers
endorsed the airline, that was a sign that the airline was a prudent venture.
Fred Harvey, the famous dining chain of the Midwest and Southwest, was now
managed by Ford Harvey, the son of its eponymous founder.87 Ford's son, Freddy, was
an aviation enthusiast: He owned his own plane, had flown in World War I and knew
Charles Lindbergh, albeit tangentially, through the air corps.88 Freddy also knew
Lindbergh's backers through the flying club in St. Louis, and, like them, believed that
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passenger air travel was the next big thing. In April of 1928, Knight mentioned that his
St. Louis brokerage house was helping raise capital for a transcontinental passenger
airline. Freddy saw an opportunity to expand the family business: Fred Harvey ran every
dining car on the Santa Fe Railway, the dining room at every station stop, and resort
hotels throughout the Southwest. Now it was possible for "the first meals served in the
air to be Fred Harvey meals."89 This was thrilling for Freddy, and probably also for Keys.
Fred Harvey meals were nationally known, the standard for out-of-home prepared food
around the country. Fred Harvey became the airline's caterer and Freddy got a seat on
the board. Freddy was also, along with William Vanderbilt, one of two private investors
in the company's original stock. Like Keys, he backed his judgement with capital.
The Ford Motor Company, which supplied the airline's planes, was represented
on the board by William B. Mayo, the company's chief engineer. This broke with Keys's
vision of a perfect, vertically-integrated corporation, but the airplane manufacturers
within his aviation empire had no planes suitable for passenger operations. Associating
with Ford Motor also gained Keys the Ford brand. Keys was not well-known among
Americans—not a household name in the way that Charles Lindbergh, Fred Harvey, or
Henry Ford were—and it sometimes seems as if he were collecting brands. Americans
may not yet have heard of Transcontinental Air Transport, but they had heard of
Lindbergh, of Harvey and Ford, and of the Pennsylvania Railroad and the Santa Fe
Railway. By building his company on established, recognized figures and brands, Keys
built an easy way for the public to understand what the airline was and why they could
trust it.
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Building a diverse, interlocking board was a way to gain the allegiance and
expertise of men already involved in diverse fields: transportation, catering, airline
operations, airplane construction. It was also an endorsement of Keys's vision. To
outside investors, the board demonstrated that T.A.T. was serious about its undertaking.
Investors would judge the venture based on those who affiliated themselves with it, so
Keys felt that the "Board of Directors and officers must be strong, because their
character is the only thing that would justify offering and buying these shares. The
Board must include: character, experience, public reputation, financial standing beyond
reproach."90
But by "strong," Keys meant that the company's directors must be upstanding,
not that they be powerful. He intended to keep the board away from much of the work of
the company and structured the board so that he could control it through agents of his
aviation empire. Thirteen of the board's twenty-one seats—a majority—were filled by
Keys's men. In a letter to Paul Henderson, one of his confidants and vice-president of
National Air Transport, Keys's airmail line, Keys noted that "if we are not able between
us to shape the general policies of the Transcontinental, I think that it will be our own
fault almost entirely."91 The board thus gave Keys both the appearance of wide-ranging
support and the latitude to operate according to his best judgement.
There was also a geographic element to the board's composition.92 Directors
were distributed roughly along the transcontinental route: Keys in New York, the officers
of the Pennsylvania Railroad in the mid-Atlantic, Lindbergh's backers in St. Louis,
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Freddy Harvey in Kansas City, his company Fred Harvey across the southwest, and, in
California, Thomas B. Eastland, a director of the Aviation Corporation of California. This
way, financial and material support for the airline was distributed along its route. The
airline was national, but also local wherever it went.
The aviation field was new and unsettled. Ideas moved like clouds across the
sky, shifting, merging, forming and re-forming. Over a series of months, Keys shaped
T.A.T., translating it from an idea into a corporation. His managerial style was
methodical and detail-oriented, ideal for taking a big idea—Lindbergh National Air Lines
—and giving it practical form. On May 14, 1928, Transcontinental Air Transport was
officially incorporated. With this event, wrote Lindbergh, "the time of dreaming and
talking had passed. We were faced with the practical problem of creating a safe and
attractive service that would eventually make money."93 The airline, Lindbergh
recognized, would have to attract passengers.
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3. The Construction of an Airline, or: "The day we are properly ready."
As the War gave aviation its first great impetus, so did the War give it a flavor. For a
decade after the last young ace drained a flask of Scotch and jumped into the cockpit of
his bomber, the fine flavor of recklessness hung about this new-born sport and industry of
the air. As a result, while the world's store of adventure and romance was measurably
renewed, very little was added to the world's knowledge of transport. For transport is a
different matter altogether. Transport is not created in a series of gallant, superhuman
bursts, but by sustained and sober effort. There is not time, figuratively or literally, for
flasks of Scotch in the transport business.
– Fortune magazine, April 1930 94
Air travel in the United States is soon to emerge from the spasmodic era of the thermos
bottle, the cheese sandwich and the leather jacket. Passengers' safety and comfort are,
above all else, to command the attention of the newly formed Transcontinental Air
Transport, Inc., which announced its plans last week.
—Time magazine, May 1928 95

Hardly any American airlines offered passenger service in the early part of the
20th century. Profit lay in federal airmail contracts, not passenger fares. Compared to
airmail rates, passenger fares were worth significantly less per pound. Airplanes were
small, often lacking space for anything more than a pilot and a mailbag. If a passenger
could be accommodated, he or she might sit in a second cockpit, open to the elements,
or in a small cabin surrounded by bags of airmail. Airlines regarded passengers as
outright nuisances. As the old railroad saying went, "freight doesn't complain."96
Passengers got hot, or cold, or hungry. They expected safety; worse than that, they
expected comfort. Several airmail lines raised their passenger fares to discourage
bookings. If they carried passengers at all, it was generally on an ad hoc basis. The
mood was not welcoming. Passengers were "provided with flying suit and parachute,
often asked to carry a sack of mail on their laps, and sometimes dumped at some point
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along the route to make way for the priority mail."97 Early airports offered minimal
passenger facilities, notes architectural critic Alastair Gordon. They were industrial
places, their buildings all "shabby hangars or shacks for servicing mail planes."98 In this
inhospitable atmosphere, the determined passenger could travel by air—but few
passengers were so determined.
Transcontinental Air Transport would be different. Keys was a contemporary of
men like Fred Harvey and George Pullman, who had built entire companies by selling
excellent passenger service.99 What they had done for rail, T.A.T. would do for the air:
Provide a seamless, luxurious travel experience. With the airline's corporate structure in
place, Keys turned to building a passenger airline. This chapter chronicles the
construction of the airline's physical infrastructure and of its public image. The airline's
mission to serve passengers influenced every step it took. Physical infrastructure—
airfields, radio towers, weather stations—had to be built almost entirely from scratch, a
monumental undertaking, surpassed only in scale, scope, and reach by the construction
of the transcontinental railroads sixty years earlier. But construction wasn't enough: The
airline also had to convince potential passengers that flying was a safe and enjoyable
way to travel.
It is tempting to view the airplane as a beast entirely loosed from the surly bonds
of Earth, as a lone machine that can range across the sky. But landings must
accompany take-offs, and each must be made at prepared air fields. The airplane's
infrastructural needs are as fixed and necessary as those of the railroad or automobile
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—they are merely less visible. Like its gravity-bound compatriots, the airplane could not
bridge the country without a base of infrastructure, and yet aviation infrastructure was
precisely what the country lacked.
Construction began not with building airports but with building capital. The
company initially raised three million dollars ($38 million). Keys then decided to raise an
additional two million dollars ($25 million) for "unknown contingencies." "Contingencies
have been the most important thing that I have encountered in all my life and I always
expect lots of them," he explained.100 By the time the company was organized it had five
million dollars ($63 million) in capital. Building the airline would be expensive and Keys
expected initial operating losses as travelers adjusted to the idea of air travel. The
airline needed to have a store of reserves to carry it through lean times.
The airline's founders knew that they wanted a transcontinental route. As they
selected station stops, several factors guided their work. "It was apparent that the route
should be laid out as directly as possible, in consistence with areas of population and
safety and regularity of operation," Lindbergh wrote in 1930.101 T.A.T. would stop in
centers of population, so as to maximize its base of potential passengers. Wichita, in
Kansas, and St. Louis and Kansas City, in Missouri, were all included on the route, even
though their inclusion made the route less direct. It was also important that the route be
safe and comfortable—passengers were rightly assumed to have a much lower
tolerance for turbulence and rough weather than trained pilots. The airline used
government weather records to determine which routes would "offer the least difficulties
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from the point of view of weather, head winds, sudden storms, fogs, et cetera."102 The
final route avoided mountain ranges, which caused turbulence, were prone to bad
weather, and were difficult for even veteran pilots to navigate. This was why passengers
left New York by train—it was easy to travel through the Allegheny Mountains by train,
but difficult and dangerous to fly over them.103 In the Southwest, T.A.T. chose a route
over flat stretches of desert and over the low western mountains to take advantage of
relatively clear weather and minimal turbulence.104 Wherever possible, T.A.T. aimed to
fly through smooth skies.
The ideal route for weather and passengers was then compared and
"coordinated with a study of rail schedules on both lines of the Santa Fe Railroad," so
that passengers could make their sleeper train connections each night.105 Some stops
were selected with eye to the operation of the entire system. For example, Waynoka,
Oklahoma, and Clovis, New Mexico, were chosen in preference to other cities because
"a more perfectly balanced flying time between the eastern and western divisions can
be maintained over the Waynoka-Clovis route."106 Safety, reliability, and affordability,
those same watchwords that Keys first elucidated in 1925, guided the translation of the
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transcontinental idea into an actual route and schedule. When the route was finalized in
February of 1929, there were fourteen stops (see Figure 4).107
Unfortunately, there were not fourteen airports. "In a preliminary survey by
Colonel Lindbergh it was learned there were no existing airports suitable for use of TAT
planes."108 The airline responded to this daunting task with a methodical approach and
built fourteen airports over a period of six months.109 It cleared and graded land, built
runways and terminal facilities, installed lighting, and, in some cases, built roads to the
nearest town. At each airport, T.A.T. built a smartly appointed passenger station with
waiting rooms, restrooms, and a newsstand. The stations in Columbus, Ohio, and
Albuquerque, New Mexico, each also housed a restaurant and offices for T.A.T. The
influence of Fred Harvey and the Santa Fe Railway was evident in Albuquerque, where
the T.A.T. station was "done in the old Spanish style of architecture familiar to the
region," all adobe and tile (see Figure 5). The Columbus station was a handsome twostory building clad in cream-colored brick.110 T.A.T. bragged that its stations were "equal
in comfort and convenience to a railroad passenger station."111 Clearly, this was a shift
from the shabby, industrial hangars used by mail planes. By building on the established
architectural type of the railroad station, already well-known to passengers, T.A.T. aimed
to normalize air travel and make it seem familiar.
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Cities were eager to be on the T.A.T. route—so eager, in fact, that the San
Francisco Examiner, in its coverage of the airline, felt that the city had been snubbed
and "wrote its story around the resentment of San Francisco, that Los Angeles was
chosen as a Western Terminal."112 The Examiner, offended that San Francisco-bound
passengers would "be forced to go to Los Angeles first," called for a bifurcated route
with terminals in both cities, or, if that was not possible, the "establishment of similar
service with other railroads and airplane companies direct between San Francisco and
New York." Milo F. Kent, the chairman of San Francisco's Supervisors' Airport
Committee, told the Examiner that "our commercial value and importance demand our
being given direct service in the establishment of such a line. We are a force to be
reckoned with." James Rolph, San Francisco's mayor, and Frank A. Flynn,
superintendent of the San Francisco Municipal Airport, concurred with Kent, the paper
reported.113 This resentment is historically interesting because it mirrors the bitter
campaigns waged by cities for the attention of railroad companies. In the 1840s and
1850s, Chicago and St. Louis jockeyed to be the focus of the railroads in the
Midwest;114 later in the century, Tacoma and Seattle vied to be the western terminus of
Northern Pacific Railroad's northern transcontinental route. City leaders may not have
been sure what to make of aviation, but they didn't want to be left out.
Equally interesting is how T.A.T. responded to San Francisco’s complaints: They
sent in Charles Lindbergh. Keys recognized that Lindbergh's celebrity could be a
powerful diplomatic force. "Colonel Lindbergh was dispatched to the West Coast to
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endeavor to smooth out the relationship between the T.A.T. and the city and press of
San Francisco," wrote Keys.115 T.A.T. vice-president Paul Henderson recommended
appeasing the Examiner with a vague promise for future service after T.A.T. worked out
the technical problems of night flying.116 While in San Francisco, Lindbergh "had
interviews with the Mayor and Commissioners and the Press and apparently
accomplished the object desired, as the attitude of the Examiner since that time has
been much broader," Keys wrote.117 But T.A.T. still planned on using Los Angeles as its
western terminus. Lindbergh's visit, wrote Henderson, was nothing more than a "song
and dance."118
Airports were the most visible part of the network, but T.A.T. invested significant
resources behind the scenes to ensure passenger comfort and safety. The airline built a
coast-to-coast radio network, which its pilots used to stay in touch with ground stations
and to navigate along the route.119 Radio-equipped planes were new and radio
navigation promised to be safer than navigating by landmarks on the ground, as airmail
pilots had done for years. On the ground, a teletype network connected airports,
weather stations, and radio towers to each other. T.A.T. employees could use it to send
weather reports and use it for "plane dispatching, ordering plane movements, [and the]
transmission of reports, reservation requests and inter-company messages."120
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Essentially, the airline replicated the type of communications network that allowed the
railroads to function as large, integrated companies.
Radio and teletype made national air travel possible, but the airline's weather
bureau made it safe. The fickle nature of weather had long bedeviled aviation: Pilots
routinely took off without any knowledge of conditions at their destination and could only
improvise a response if weather deteriorated en route. Solving the weather problem was
especially important for passenger aviation because passengers could not parachute
out of their planes, as airmail pilots sometimes did. By linking a system of weather
reporting stations—more than 40 of them, strung along its route—T.A.T. sought to "place
before the pilot an exact picture of conditions surrounding him." These stations, when
coupled with the airline's vast radio network, meant that a pilot could be "informed of
adverse conditions lying ahead of him and advised to detour through more favorable
areas."121 This new ability to see distant weather would, the airline hoped, greatly
reduce the danger of flying. These three systems—radio, teletype, and weather—knit
the entire transcontinental airline into a tightly coordinated, interconnected network and
shrunk the distance between planes and airports. They made flight predictable, and
therefore safer. T.A.T.'s planes would range through empty skies and land at lonely
airports, but they would never be alone.
The airline's planes, like its infrastructure, were chosen with an emphasis on
safety and reliability. Early airplanes, commonly built from wood and cloth and powered
by a single engine, were small, crude, and unreliable.122 Aviation technology in the late
1920s was so unsophisticated that Lindbergh, whose role in the airline included
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selecting airplanes, was, in his words, "planning an airline around nonexistent aircraft."
"Airplanes had to be faster, safer, and more reliable than the best being produced," he
later wrote.123 On Lindbergh's recommendation, the airline purchased ten Ford TriMotors (see Figure 3). The Tri-Motor—a big, metal monoplane with three engines—had
its genesis with Henry Ford, who had declared that "metal's the thing of the future."124
Metal was more durable than fabric, especially important for an airplane's wings, where
lifting ability could be adversely affected by fabric degradation. An airplane with multiple
engines could sustain flight even if an engine failed, making it safer, far more reliable,
and vastly better suited to passenger service than a single-engine plane. "There is also
a traffic sales advantage in operating a passenger line with all metal ships," wrote
Lindbergh in an equipment selection report, "and as the public becomes better
acquainted with flying this advantage will increase."125 As it had with airport
construction, the airline chose equipment carefully, guided by the need to keep its
passengers safe and comfortable.
As it built runways and radio towers, the airline also built a mental infrastructure,
a way for the public to understand it. In this realm, the airline worked not from scratch,
but built on the store of air-mindedness that had accumulated in the American
consciousness over the previous two decades. If the airline was to attract passengers, it
first had to allay common concerns about aviation. Many people "do not take to the
skies naturally without nervousness," wrote Keys.126 To normalize the experience and
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give potential passengers a point of comparison, T.A.T. repeatedly compared air travel
to rail travel.127 The passenger experience it offered was almost comparable to Pullman
class accommodations on trains. Its planes had on-time records "that may well be
compared with the records of our greatest railroads."128 And its pilots were "building a
tradition of the air that will stand beside the older traditions of land and sea—traditions
great because all alike are founded on safety, regularity, reliability."129 Linking T.A.T. to
the railroads and to earlier forms of transportation would, the airline hoped, locate it
within a historical continuum that passengers could understand.
The airline also traded heavily on its relationship with aviation celebrities. Charles
Lindbergh personified aviation and the airline's marketing materials invoked his name as
often as possible, noting his selection of airport sites, his survey of airplanes, and his
management of pilot hiring.130 The airline also hired Amelia Earhart, who had risen to
fame in 1928 for being the first woman to fly across the Atlantic Ocean (albeit as a
member of the flight crew, not as a pilot).131 That same year, Earhart became the first
woman to fly solo across the United States. Her role with T.A.T. was "Assistant to the
General Traffic Manager," but, as with Lindbergh, her title was less important than her
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association with the airline. Earhart wrote a column directed at female passengers for
TAT Plane Talk, the airline's monthly newsletter.132 Such celebrity endorsements would,
the company hoped, communicate to potential passengers that it was a quality
operation.
The airline also attempted to assuage passenger concerns with aesthetics. The
cabin of each Ford Tri-Motor was sumptuously appointed. "Interior decorations and
fittings are in soft restful tones with here and there a touch of modern art," noted a
company brochure.133 Each of the ten wicker seats inside the cabin—five on each side
of a narrow aisle—had its own wall light, a window that slid open, and a floor heater.
The cabin was equipped with a lavatory and small galley. There were magazines and
daily newspapers available. A courier—T.A.T.'s term for flight attendant—attended to
passengers, selling playing cards, offering stationary, and setting up "portable tables" on
request. Meals, prepared by Fred Harvey chefs and delivered to the plane when it
stopped in St. Louis, tended to be light. On one early flight, passengers were offered
"freshly made sandwiches—chicken salad, egg salad, and cheese—along with a pickle,
a piece of cake, an apple, a banana, and a choice of coffee or milk," served by the
courier on portable tables with lavender tablecloths.134 In short, read a company
brochure, the Tri-Motor offered "all the comforts and facilities of ordinary transportation,"
as if it were an airborne Pullman coach.135
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The couriers and pilots wore uniforms modeled on U.S. Navy uniforms: Navy
blue double-breasted jackets with gold sleeve stripes denoting rank, white shirt and dark
tie, navy blue trousers, and a navy blue combination cap.136 This outfit was designed to
impart a sense of order to passengers, suggesting that aviation was orderly and
hierarchical, and visibly countering the popular assumption that pilots were daring
rascals in leather bomber jackets.
T.A.T. marketed its service to business travelers, tourists, and "frequent
travelers." The speed advantage enjoyed by the airplane over the train meant that "the
business man who estimates his wealth in hours as well as dollars will find it profitable"
to travel by air, wrote an airline brochure. A business traveler could even use an
airplane's on-board radio to "stay in touch with his office in New York." For the tourist,
the airplane's speed was "a means of lengthening his play time." T.A.T. offered stopover privileges in the Southwest so that travelers could enjoy a Fred Harvey Detour, a
package tour for "detourists" who wanted to travel off the beaten-path. The frequent
traveler, who perhaps found rail travel boring, "will welcome the new service as an
opportunity of becoming acquainted with and understanding America."137 By showing
how these groups could benefit from air travel, T.A.T. hoped to accustom potential
passengers to the idea of flight.
Construction and marketing continued as May slipped into June, and June into
July. Keys had announced in January that T.A.T. would not begin passenger service
until "the day we are properly ready," thereby turning an unknown opening date into an
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asset.138 More than a year of development—why rush things? The past year's work had
been guided by Keys's watchwords: safety, reliability, affordability. As T.A.T. turned its
collective efforts from building an airline to operating one, 'quality' entered this
parthenon of watchwords. It had been no simple feat to build an airline, but neither
would it be simple to keep passengers happy—or even to keep passengers.
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4. Ascent and Descent, or: "Fly The Lindbergh Line."
Even with fifteen years of flying experience this inaugural trip over T.A.T. is astoundingly
pleasant as we now are flying above continental divide at nine thousand feet. I have just
looked down upon lava beds and into extinct volcano craters and observed scenery as
mankind never before has seen it. I predict a great future for T.A.T. All passengers aboard
are highly enthusiastic over trip scenic effects and T.A.T. efficiency. Never again do I wish
to use a railroad to cross the continent
—Edgar S. Gorrell, passenger aboard the inaugural flight, in a telegram composed en
route 139

Transcontinental Air Transport began passenger service on July 7, 1929.
Lindbergh's brief tap of his transcontinental button was a link in a chain of made-formedia moments that composed the tightly choreographed, forty-eight-hour long
inauguration of service. The ceremonies emphasized themes of celebrity, incorporation,
and nationalism. For these two days, the culmination of the company's public relations
effort, it seemed as thought T.A.T. had done the impossible: It had slashed travel times
between the coasts in half, while charging a fare comparable to that of the railroad.140
But the true test of T.A.T.'s accomplishments would occur over the weeks and months
that followed. Would people want to fly?
The airline's opening day began with ceremonies at Pennsylvania Station in New
York City. A thousand people gathered to hear a roster of speeches and to watch the
departure of The Airway Limited, the Pennsylvania Railroad's new overnight train to
Columbus, Ohio, T.A.T.'s jumping-off point. The five people who spoke—Paul
Henderson, vice-president of T.A.T.; Amelia Earhart, who held an executive post with
T.A.T.; Elisha Lee, vice-president of the Pennsylvania Railroad; Dr. John H. Finley,
editor of The New York Times; and Hon. Grover Whalen, the police commissioner of
139
140

" 'The Day We Are Properly Ready,' " TAT Plane Talk, SPL AHC.

T.A.T. offered an all-inclusive transcontinental service for $375 ($4,700), compared to a typical railroad
fare of $335 ($4,200) for drawing-room class accommodations.

Fraga 53

New York City—represented the transportation companies involved, the media, and the
government, with a dash of grandeur and celebrity thrown in.141 The speeches were
broadcast live over radio stations in New York, Philadelphia, and Cincinnati, extending
the event beyond those present.142 Dr. Finley, his paper reported,
recalled the days of the covered wagon, telling of his view of the first train "as it came
creeping slowly across the prairies on a newly laid track." "A few months ago, in visiting
my birthplace," he said, "I saw a beacon in sight of the field which I had plowed as a boy
and near it an emergency landing field where—it is now proudly related—one who was
known to the people of the neighborhood as 'Lindy' used to alight as an airmail pilot."143

Finley's speech echoed the themes of manifest destiny that had ricocheted about the
West for decades. His careful chronology of the successive forms of transportation that
were used to bridge the West turned away from the novelty of air-mindedness and
instead emphasized how aviation was similar to that which came before it, not different.
In Finley's formulation, airplanes naturally followed covered wagons and trains—they
were already familiar, just as T.A.T.'s marketing materials had repeatedly suggested.
The ceremonies included the christening of one of T.A.T.'s Ford Tri-Motors. The
airplane, named The City of New York, had been brought into Pennsylvania Station for
the occasion.144 Each of T.A.T.'s planes was named for a city along its route. This
practice, when applied to airplanes, was a powerful metaphor of incorporation. Each
plane physically linked cities to each other and into a larger national transportation
network; their names emphasized their ability to shrink distance. Amelia Earhart
christened the ship, tying her celebrity to the airplane's purpose.
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After the speeches, after the last passengers had boarded The Airway Limited,
the crowd at Platform 15 grew quiet in anticipation (see Figure 6). At 6:05 PM, Eastern
time, the light flashed, the crowd cheered, and the train rolled slowly out of the
station,145 as a band on a flatcar rolled alongside, playing "California, Here We
Come."146 It was as if Lindbergh had reached one hand across the continent to summon
the train. The ritual emphasized that the airline should be thought of in national, not
local, terms. Air travel connected the country, and so it made sense that its inaugural
proceedings would also. The ceremonies held over the next two days continued to
stress this new sense of incorporation.
The next morning, The Airway Limited arrived at Columbus, Ohio, to a station
decked with American-flag bunting. A crowd of 3,000 people had gathered in the steady
morning rain to watch its arrival and await the take-off of two planes, The City of
Columbus and The City of Wichita. Just before 8:15 AM, Eastern time, the two planes,
"looking very much like two huge bugs," taxied to the center of the field and sat,
propellors spinning, awaiting clearance for take-off. The signal came from Robert P.
Lamont, the U.S. Secretary of Commerce, who pushed a button in Washington, DC,
"which sounded a gong at planeside" in Columbus.147 This cross-country ritual
replicated Lindbergh's transcontinental reach. The City of Columbus would take off from
the city's airport, but Lamont's interjection reminded the assembled observers that there
was little about the day that was local. Along the route, "brief ceremonies were held at
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each T.A.T. station as the inaugural planes paused for fuel," and the route across
America was slowly consecrated, airport by airport.148
That same day, in Los Angeles, 30,000 people assembled to watch the departure
of the first east-bound plane, The City of Los Angeles. Actress Mary Pickford, America's
sweetheart, christened the airplane just before take-off and Charles Lindbergh flew the
first east-bound leg, from Los Angeles to Winslow, Arizona (see Figure 6). He stayed at
Winslow overnight and then flew the final leg of the west-bound plane carrying the
passengers that had left New York at the push of his button two days earlier. This plane,
The City of Philadelphia, was received by 20,000 people in Los Angeles and christened
by Gloria Swanson, another movie star.149 The inclusion of celebrities in these
ceremonies served to generate public interest in the airline and its passenger service.
Each of these events connected the local to the national, just as Lindbergh's
stops along his air tour had done the previous year. The ceremonies surrounding the
airline's opening days were developed and staged to have maximum impact in the
national media. T.A.T. was an airline, but also an idea, an idea endorsed by celebrities
and trusted firms and made national through newspapers, radio broadcasts, and
newsreels.150 On that clear July day, Lindbergh pushed a button and catapulted the idea
of transcontinental passenger air service into the national consciousness. The 48-hourcelebration of the start of service was, in many ways, the high point of the airline's short
life.
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The gleam and glitz quickly faded. Although more than 55,000 people attended
some part of the opening day ceremonies, and while thousands more watched, listened,
or read about them, the airline attracted few passengers. In July, its first month of
operation, the airline reported filling 37% of its available capacity. In August, it filled
47.5% of capacity. To the airline, these "steadily increasing figures" were an "indication
of the general demand for air and rail travel."151 But these numbers also meant that
T.A.T. was routinely flying its planes half-empty: On its ten-passenger Tri-Motors, a
plane that was 37% full meant three or four passengers—flown and attended to by a
crew of three. Keys privately expressed disappointment that the passenger load factor
wasn't higher.152 Americans, it seems, were still thrilled by the idea of flight, but not
terribly interested in becoming passengers.
If passengers had to acclimate to the idea of flying, it seems also that pilots had
to acclimate to the idea of flying passengers. Shortly before the start of service, Paul F.
Collins, the airline's superintendent, wrote a memorandum that outlined rules for T.A.T.'s
pilots. "Bearing in mind that many of our passengers have never been in the air before
and that their safety and comfort are our primary considerations," he wrote, "steep
climbing turns, side slips, and a rolling ship are to be avoided as much as possible."153
T.A.T.'s executives were obviously concerned with making air travel feel smooth, but the
company's pilots, while they looked clean-cut in their naval uniforms, still had some
daredevil in them. Two months later, Collins penned a second memo, writing that "It is
found necessary to again emphasize the elimination of climbing turns and steep banks,
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except in an emergency."154 Passengers, substantially less accustomed to the feeling of
flight, felt jolts and banks more acutely than did pilots.
Not that the Tri-Motors made flight comfortable for passengers. The Tri-Motor's
small cabin was not insulated against the noise or vibration of the plane's three huge
engines. The cabin was extremely loud and vibrated as if passengers were in a car
barreling down a gravel road.155 The lack of insulation further meant that passengers
alternately sweated and shivered their way through the Southwest. On the ground, the
all-aluminum airplane caught and held the sun's rays, turning the cabin into an oven. As
the plane climbed to its cruising altitude, the cabin temperature dropped towards
freezing, a condition that the inadequate on-board heaters could do little to correct. And
because the cabins were not pressurized, T.A.T.'s planes had to fly comparatively low,
at altitudes between 3,000 and 5,000 feet. (Above 8,000 feet, people begin to be
affected by altitude sickness; above 10,000 feet, they lose consciousness.) Flying this
low meant that the planes were buffeted by turbulence, especially over rocky terrain. A
service ceiling of 5,000 feet also meant that T.A.T.'s planes had to fly around storms,
instead of over them. The noise, the vibration, the vast swings in temperature, and the
turbulence all combined to make a flight aboard a Tri-Motor an uncomfortable and
harrowing experience.156
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And then: Disaster. On September 7th, 1929, two months to the day after the
airline inaugurated service, searchers announced that they had located The City of San
Francisco, which had been missing for nearly a week. The airplane, it appeared, had
encountered a storm along its route and reversed course. The pilot, unable to determine
the plane's exact position, crashed into the side of Mount Taylor, killing all five
passengers and all three crew. The New York Times, The Los Angeles Times, and The
Washington Post all carried news of the disaster on their front pages, and the crash—
the very type of crash the airline had hoped its weather and radio networks would
prevent—stood to dramatically impact the airline's public image. The airline immediately
suspended service so that its airplanes could be "thoroughly tested and examined for
their air worthiness,"157 and issued a statement in the next issue of TAT Plane Talk:
"Every member of the T A T organization shares the sorrow of relatives and friends of
those who were aboard the plane."
While the airline could inspect its planes and issue regrets, the cause had been
pilot error and there was little else it could do. The same note in TAT Plane Talk
reminded passengers that "Never was an air line presented for public service with such
thorough preparation and adequate equipment."158 When service resumed the following
week, the first plane to fly out of Columbus had ten passengers—100% capacity for a
Tri-Motor.159 It is difficult to know what to make of this. Perhaps the tide of public opinion
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was turning and Americans, initially skittish about flight, had come to see aviation as just
another mode of transportation.
Whatever the case, T.A.T. lost money on its operations in 1929. Keys and his
fellow directors expected to lose money at first. Soon before the start of service, Keys
had written that "losses have occurred in the early days of almost all known forms of
passenger transportation by steamship, rail, bus, or electric lines. There is nothing
unusual, therefore, in expecting the same to happen in air transportation."160 T.A.T. had
banked the money necessary to carry it through such short-term losses until operating
costs dropped far enough for the venture to be profitable. Keys had supreme
"confidence that in the long run this business will become a very great and very
profitable business."161 But the directors' store of capital didn't prepare them for the
stock market crash in October of 1929.
Keys initially dismissed the crash. "The aeronautical industry as a whole will no
doubt be affected by the financial developments of the past month in about the same
way and to about the same degree that other similar industries will be affected," he
wrote in October.162 If anything, the crash would prune smaller, poorly-capitalized
companies and "automatically reduce the competition against the older, well-financed
companies," including his own. But the seriousness of the crash soon became evident.
By January, the value of aviation stocks had plummeted. As passenger bookings
dropped, T.A.T. responding by slashing fares for a transcontinental trip, to $127.50
($1,600) from $319 ($4,000). The company cheerily announced the cuts with a
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justification that obscured the new financial reality: "Recognizing the ever increasing
popularity of air travel, with the rapidly rising demand for the type of luxurious
transportation offered by Transcontinental Air Transport, Inc., a substantial reduction in
rates has been made."163 Privately, the company was less buoyant. In the annual report
for the 1929 fiscal year, Keys wrote: "While operating losses had, of course, been
expected during the pioneer steps of this enterprise, these results were disappointing,
both in respect to gross volume of traffic and to cost of operations."164 Indeed, the fare
cuts only made a bad situation worse. Before the crash, Keys had written that "It is
hardly possible to sell, at a profit, transportation by air for passengers"—and that was
when the airline planned on fares of $300 or more.165 The airline was left with a revenue
of about six cents per passenger mile, far below its per-mile operating costs. By the end
of 1929, T.A.T. was losing money on every flight. After the receipts were totaled, the
airline had spent three times as much money as it made, nearly $500,000 in revenue
($6 million) but more than $1.5 million in expenses ($18 million). In fiscal year 1929, the
airline posted an operating deficit of nearly a million dollars ($12 million) and was on
track to lose several hundred thousand dollars in 1930.166 Its financial position was not
sustainable. For the last three years, Keys had carefully shaped and shepherded the
airline from its first conception to its final realization. Now, "the first great passenger
trunk line of the country"167 seemed headed for bankruptcy.
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Coda, or: "How Far is An Hour?"
These are fundamental things. On them the future must be built. You may take it for
granted that that future is a permanent future, that air transport is a settled and
permanent thing and that nearly all of you will live to see every city in the United States
linked to every other city by this fastest known means of safe transportation.
– Clement Keys, January 1929 168

In 1930, as Transcontinental Air Transport wobbled through another rough year,
U.S. Postmaster General Walter Folger Brown looked out over a nation buzzing with
small airplanes operated by small airlines. Brown shared Keys' desire for national
passenger service: He wanted "an integrated national network of transcontinental lines
operated by large, well-financed corporations in regulated competition with one
another."But instead, the country had "a plethora of little airlines covering the nation,"
and Brown "could not build a national air transportation network around little
companies."169 Brown had the power to dramatically restructure the nation's air
transportation system. Most of the country's airlines were under contract with the Post
Office to carry airmail, and the McNary-Watres Act, which had just passed into law on
April 29, 1930, expanded Brown's authority over how routes and contracts were
assigned to airlines—power that he used to promote passenger aviation.
Brown changed airmail contracts to add a per-mile bonus for airplanes that
carried passengers, subsidizing and thereby encouraging passenger transport. Then,
over a series of conferences with aviation industry leaders, Brown consolidated the
industry by encouraging—and sometimes mandating—mergers between companies.
His vision, van der Linden writes, "involved an integrated national network of
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transcontinental lines operated by large, well-financed corporations in regulated
competition with each other," and his goal was "to save the major passenger airlines."170
Brown aimed to have three transcontinental lines, following northern, middle, and
southern routes. For the middle route, Brown picked out T.A.T. and Western Air Express.
T.A.T., experience-rich, cash-poor, and still losing money, readily acceded to Brown's
proposition that it merge with Western, a thriving, successful regional airmail line with a
network that covered the West and Southwest. Keys had courted Western before,
offering an airmail partnership with National Air Transport in 1925 and a merger with
T.A.T. in 1928. Western had no interest then, and less interest in 1930: Why should it
take on a struggling company? But Brown insisted, and hinted that their combined
company would be awarded the airmail contract for the middle route. After six weeks of
negotiations, Western's directors acquiesced and the companies merged, forming a
new operation: Transcontinental and Western Air. It, too, would be The Lindbergh Line.
Transcontinental Air Transport stopped flying on July 15, 1930, one year and
eight days after it began passenger service. One of its promotional pamphlets—studded
with images of the large Tri-Motors in flight, their smartly uniformed pilots and couriers,
the radio and weather men hard at work—had told passengers that "TAT service, while
transcontinental in its scope, is an extension of existing transportation facilities
throughout the United States," the pamphlet read. "It is, in a word, the highest
achievement of American Transportation."171 And for a while, it was. It had been as if
Keys, a modern-day Prometheus, had stolen the technology of flight from aviation
demigods and presented it to mere mortals. He had made the skies safe and
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comfortable, a place where well-to-do travelers could play cards, dictate telegrams, or
take afternoon tea. He had tamed the clouds and domesticated the idea of flight.
On December 29, 1934, long after Lindbergh's flight and Lindbergh's button and
the merger with Western Air Express, T.A.T. stockholders found a letter from the
company's secretary, asking them to swap their shares of stock for shares of T.&W.A.172
The stock-swap formally ended T.A.T.'s long flight.
The legacy of this short-lived airline is two-fold. First, the possibility of crossing
the continent in 48 hours shrunk the nation. Second, the airline's transcontinental
mission brought the West closer to the East. T.A.T is responsible for the underpinnings
of these two ideas, a smaller nation and a closer West.
The airplane resembled the railroad in its ability to collapse distance. Wolfgang
Schivelbusch, in his analysis of the changes wrought by the railroad, wrote that the
railroad's speed meant that a "given spatial distance, traditionally covered in a fixed
amount of travel time, could suddenly be dealt with in a fraction of that time; to put it
another way, the same amount of time permitted one to cover the old spatial distance
many times over."173 Just as "space was both diminished and expanded" by the speed
of the railroad,174 so to was it diminished and expanded by the speed of the airplane,
drawing physically distant cities and towns closer together in time. Speed, intimately
bound to time, brought distant places closer. This rhetoric was used again and again in
the airline's promotional materials and by the reporters who wrote articles about its
service. A transcontinental airline, opined the San Francisco Chronicle, "must have a
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speeding up influence on transaction of business and stimulation of travel. It puts within
reach of many people what they have been denied by limitations of time."175 Relative
distance between cities melted into ever-smaller units of time. In its marketing materials,
T.A.T. compared the relative travel times between cities: "Kansas City, normally 34
hours from New York [by train] is brought within 19 hours." An air trip between Los
Angeles, California, and Clovis, New Mexico, was "six hours against almost a 24-hour
journey by train." And a flight between Indianapolis, Indianapolis, and St. Louis,
Missouri, was only two hours, "a saving of four hours in the heart of the business
day."176 Speed was at once distance, time, and commodity. "At any of the ticket
windows nearby, you can purchase a small strip of pasteboard that represents two
useful days added to your life—two days snatched from traveling time,"177 wrote the
Pennsylvania Railroad in an advertisement for T.A.T.
The airplane's boundlessness allowed it to be seen as an instrument of
internationalization. As Jenifer van Vleck has argued: "Soaring above the territorial
borders of nation-states, airplanes appeared to diminish the very significance of
geopolitics."178 Aboard an airplane, borders could be not just crossed but transcended.
Aviation "allowed Americans to conceive the entire globe as an object of analysis and
sphere of influence."179 The airplane was a tool for looking outward, for thinking the
world and imagining America's place within it. But it was also used to look inward and to
reinforce existing borders. Benedict Anderson has argued that the rise of print
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capitalism in the eighteenth century "made it possible to 'think' the nation," to
understand a group of invisible fellow-readers as homogenous and interconnected.180
Similarly, T.A.T.'s explicit project to be a transcontinental trunk line, a national backbone,
offered a new way to think the nation: As a national entity solidly contained between two
coasts, instead of a boundless confederation of local or regional groups. Keys's decision
to fly transcontinentally—rather than locally, or up or down a coast, or across an ocean
—was a deliberate one. The choice was guided, partially, by concerns about cost,
safety, and reliability, but also by a desire to bridge the continent.
A transcontinental trip implies completion or enclosure: There is nowhere further
to go. Such journeys have long captured the American imagination and the journey to
the Pacific is a well-known trope of national incorporation. Meriwether Lewis and William
Clark surveyed newly-acquired western lands with their Corps of Discovery between
1804 and 1806. In the middle of the nineteenth century, thousands of pioneers traveled
the Overland Trail between Missouri and Oregon. Transcontinental stagecoach service
began in 1858, offering a three-week journey to the Pacific coast. And the completion of
the transcontinental railroad line in 1869 seemed especially heartening, coming as it did
at the end of the Civil War. Now air travel would have its turn to bridge the transMIssissippi West. "The distance between the Atlantic and the Pacific is being gradually
eliminated by air and rail," read the letter of introduction that Amelia Earhart carried to
the governor of California on T.A.T.'s inaugural flight.181 The interconnection that
passenger aviation promised was regarded in national terms. "The possibility of drawing
the two coast lines of America closer together by two days, has perhaps made the
180
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deepest impression" on passengers, noted one of T.A.T.'s circulars.182 C. C. Young, the
governor of California, wrote in a telegram praising T.A.T.'s start of service of his "feeling
of pleasure that the Atlantic and Pacific seaboards are to be so closely linked by the
new air transportation service which is being inaugurated today. Anyone who
contributes toward this bringing nearer together the various states of the Union is doing
a splendid service to our country as a whole."183 Faster transportation meant a smaller
country.
T.A.T.'s advertisements further suggested that to see the country from above was
to know it in a new way. Altitude offered a totalizing framework that could accommodate
all the unique parts of the United States. T.A.T.'s planes flew at relatively low altitudes by
contemporary standards: Between 1,000 and 5,000 feet, compared to 30,000 feet
today. Just as Lindbergh's recounting of his 1928 national air tour focussed on how he
came to know the country through its geography—"New England's valleys dotted by
white villages, the crystal waters of Michigan's great lakes, Arizona's pastel
deserts"184—T.A.T.'s promotional materials emphasized that the airplane's elevation
above the earth was a new way for passengers to understand the country below. "The
snow capped mountain ridges take on a beauty not apparent from the earth. Historic
spots such as old Fort Wingate, a veteran of Indian fighting, now an Indian school and
hospital, lie directly on the route," read one pamphlet.185 The plane, at a remove from
the terrain below it, offered new perspectives on the nation's geography and history, and
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passenger service translated air-mindedness into an air-nationalism. "You have crossed
the continent in 48 hours and the journey has left deep impressions of the vast beauty
of America," read a T.A.T. pamphlet.186 These two aspects of flight, speed and altitude,
each made the country feel smaller.
While T.A.T. was national in scope, it found special resonance in the West.
Aviation was growing quickly in the West, The New York Times reported in 1929, citing a
report published by the Department of Commerce: "Three air lines on the Pacific Coast
carried the largest number of passengers of all aviation services in the country during
1928."187 One of the more surprising features of the report, the Times noted, was the
extent to which people in the West were using aviation for local travel: flying up and
down the West Coast. This enthusiasm for aviation was also visible in different regional
responses to T.A.T.'s announcement in May of 1928 that it was planning a
transcontinental airline. On the East Coast, The New York Times ran a brief story under
the headline "Air Rail Line To Link All Principal Cities,"188 a story that largely replicated
T.A.T.'s press release.189 But on the West Coast, the announcement of service was
greeted both with excitement and dismay. The San Francisco Chronicle announced the
service with a banner headline—"Air, Rail Combine To Link Coasts"—across its front
page. In their headlines, these papers betrayed their regional ties: To the West, the
airline existed to link the coasts, not to connect different cities. The San Francisco
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Examiner, the Chronicle's rival paper, was so miffed that Los Angeles had been chosen
as the airline's western terminus that it mounted a publicity campaign for T.A.T. service,
more than a year before such service became available. The Examiner's response
suggests that some in the West saw access to aviation much as they had seen
railroads: As masters of their economic future. Perhaps the West, having experienced
the economic boom that accompanied the railroad, had cause to view the airplane with
excitement. The East, more established, perhaps found aviation less essential. But the
interconnection aviation afforded remained exciting.
That excitement outlived the airline. Airline advertisements from the late 1930s
and early 1940s emphasized linking the West and themes of national interconnection.
An advertisement for United Air Lines offered the headline "New York to California in the
Age of Flight," under a montage of transportation (see Figure 7). On the ground, right to
left, a covered wagon, stagecoach, Pony Express rider, and locomotive all sped towards
the viewer, recapitulating the transportation methods that bridged the West. Above,
transcendent, was the silhouette of an airplane. "Over this Overland Route trudged the
covered wagon, traveling only as far in a whole day as you will go [by plane] in three
minutes."190 The West had been conquered with the aid of many different types of
transportation technology, but only with aviation, the advertisement suggested, had the
vast West been tamed, shrunk to manageable proportions. An advertisement for the
aviation industry summarized the new index of speed and distance, asking "How Far Is
An Hour?" under an image of a western road leading into a sunset (see Figure 8). A
horse and buggy crawled towards the sunset; above them, dark against the sky, a silver
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airplane sped west. "To the thousands of people who travel by air, miles are merely
minutes...oceans and continents, hours," the ad read.191 The speed of the airplane
collapsed time and distance into each other, shrinking the continent. With air travel,
America was smaller in 1930 than it had been in 1920; by 1940, it would be smaller still.
T.A.T. set off a ceaseless drive for faster transcontinental flights that culminated with
five-hour transcontinental jet travel in 1959.
Aviation also brought the West within closer reach of Eastern tourists. Western
tourism had originated with the Santa Fe Railway and with Fred Harvey, whose package
tours and souvenirs created an idea of the West as an ancient, authentic land of
stunning natural beauty. T.A.T. was the first airline to use tourism as a way of marketing
passenger service, an idea that outlasted its corporate death. In pamphlets from the
1930s, American Airlines promoted the West as "the land of Yesterday." Its pamphlets,
directed at "New Yorkers, Detroiters, Chicagoans," and other Easterners,192 called the
West "the country of the Last Frontier—here is romance, color and thrilling
adventure."193 The West was marketed as exotic, yet familiar, a place of cowboys and
cactus within America's own borders. The West offered something for everyone: If
tourists did not care to play cowboy on a dude ranch, one could "come, forget your
cares, rest and play in this golden sunshine and breathe this dry, bracing air—that's
living!"194 The West was revitalizing, restorative, the antidote to a dull life. Conveniently,
speedy airplanes put the distant West within reach. "For a Grand Vacation, FLY," read
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one pamphlet, explaining that an air traveler could "Eliminate hurry from your itinerary...
yet see more and go farther, in less time." Flying offered "the economy of the most
vacation for your money. For example: If you have a two-weeks holiday, you can spend
14 days vacationing, without hustle and fuss... when you let our planes do your
hurrying."195 The ideas that T.A.T. had used to sell its service—speed, time, leisure, the
ability to shrink distance—appeared again and again in aviation advertisements during
the following years.
The question is this: Did Clement Keys and Transcontinental Air Transport
succeed or fail? Over two years, Keys raised five million dollars in capital, persuaded
Charles Lindbergh and the Pennsylvania Railroad and dozens of other people and
companies to join the venture, and directed the construction of a national air route and
its accompanying weather system. He built it. Passengers didn't come. After a year of
flying at a loss, the airline was desperate and readily accepted the Post Office's request
that it merge with Western Air Express. Financially, the airline failed.
But Transcontinental Air Transport remains important not so much for what it
accomplished during its short life, but for what it left behind. The airline literally paved
the way for future aviation,196 leaving a physical infrastructure that included more than a
dozen airports, nearly fifty weather stations, and hundreds of radio towers. It built an
ideological infrastructure and showed how aviation could have a meaningful impact on
the lives of Americans, whether they were business travelers or tourists. It set the
standard and paradigm for passenger service, with in-flight meals, adjustable seats, and
passenger stewards. And it pushed aviation technology forward, demanding airplanes
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that were larger, faster, and safer. A truly national airline, a paradigm of service, an
enduring call for better airplanes: These were new ideas at the time, and their staying
power has proved immense. Transcontinental Air Transport flung America into a new air
age, an age that was, in a way, the fulfillment of Lindbergh's implicit promise: Build an
airport and the future will arrive. Between there and here, then and now,
Transcontinental Air Transport remains an essential link between an America that rode
the rails and an America that wings the skies.
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Figure 1 - Clement Keys and Charles Lindbergh

Clement Keys, founder and president of Transcontinental Air Transport, at left. Charles
Lindbergh, chairman of the airline's Technical Committee, at right.197
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Figure 2 - "Lindbergh Does It!"

The New York Times announced Lindbergh's successful transatlantic flight.198
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Figure 3 - The City of Columbus

The City of Columbus, one of the airline's Ford Tri-Motors, as pictured in the first issue
of TAT Plane Talk. Note the unmuffled engines at the nose and under the wing, which
made the uninsulated cabin very loud.199
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Figure 4 - The T.A.T. Route

The airline's transcontinental route was partly constrained by geography, the routes of
its partner railroads, and the population centers of the country. The route wanders off a
direct route to include Kansas City, Missouri, and to include the overnight Santa Fe
Railway link between Waynoka, Oklahoma, and Clovis, New Mexico.200
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Figure 5 - T.A.T. Passenger Station in Albuquerque, New Mexico

T.A.T's Albuquerque passenger station, pictured in TAT Plane Talk.201
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Figure 6 - The Inauguration of Service

At top, the christening of The Airway Limited just before its departure from Pennsylvania
Station. At bottom, Charles Lindbergh at the controls of The City of Los Angeles just
before its departure from Los Angeles.202
202
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Figure 7 - "New York to California in the Age of Flight."

A United Air Lines advertisement from 1944 compares the speed of air travel to the
speed of early types of transportation.203
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Figure 8 - "How Far Is An Hour?"

An industry advertisement from 1943 compares the speed of air travel to the speed of
early types of transportation.204
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Appendix 1 — Companies owned or controlled by C. M. Keys
List prepared in 1930.205
Aviation Corporation of California
Aviation Credit Corporation
Aviation Securities Corporation, Chicago
Aviation Securities of New England
Aviation Exploration, Inc.
Bendix Aviation Corporation
Central Airport, Inc.
Curtiss-Wright Corporation
Curtiss Aeroplane Export Corporation
Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Company, Inc.
Curtiss-Wright Flying Service, Inc.
Curtiss-Wright Airports Corporation
Curtiss-Safroni Corporation
Curtiss-Robertson Airplane Manufacturing Co.
Curtiss Assets Corporation
Curtiss-Reid Aircraft Co., Ltd., Montreal
Intercontinent Aviation, Inc.
Douglas Aircraft Co., Inc.
Keystone Aircraft Corporation
National Air Transport, Inc.
National Aviation Corporation
North American Aviation, Inc.
Pitcairn Aviation, Inc.
Sperry Gyroscope Company, Inc.
Transcontinental Air Transport, Inc.
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Appendix 2 — The Board of Directors of Transcontinental Air Transport206
Harold Bixby
Vice-president, The State National Bank, St. Louis, Missouri.
Henry Breckinridge
Breckinridge & Shonk, Attorneys, St. Louis, Missouri.
Howard E. Coffin
Chairman, National Air Transport, Inc.†; Director, National Aviation Corporation†;
Director, North American Aviation, Inc.†; Director, Curtiss Flying Service, Inc.†
J. Cheever Cowdin*
Vice-president, Blair & Company; Vice-president, North American Aviation, Inc.†;
Director, North American Aviation, Inc.†; Director, National Aviation Corporation†;
Director, Curtiss Flying Service, Inc.†
Chester W. Cuthell*
Cuthell, Hotchkiss & Mills, Attys.; Director, North American Aviation, Inc.†;
Director, National Aviation Corporation†; Director, Curtiss Flying Service, Inc.†;
Director, Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Co., Inc.†
Thomas Dysart
Knight, Dysart & Gamble, St. Louis, Missouri; Director, North American Aviation,
Inc.†
Thomas B. Eastland
Bond & Goodwin & Tucker, Inc., San Francisco, California; Director, Aviation
Corporation of California†; Director, North American Aviation, Inc.†
Julien L. Eysmans
Vice-president in charge of Traffic, Pennsylvania Railroad.
Fred ("Freddy") Harvey*
Fred Harvey, Kansas City, Missouri.
Paul Henderson*
Vice-president, National Air Transport, Inc.†; Director, National Air Transport,
Inc.†; Director, North American Aviation, Inc.†
Richard Hoyt*
Hayden, Stone & Company; Chairman of the Board, Wright Aeronautical
Corporation.†
Leonard Kennedy*
Vice-president, Curtiss Aeroplane and Motor Co., Inc.†; Director, National Air
Transport, Inc.†; Director, North American Aviation, Inc.†; Director, National
Aviation Corporation†; Director, Curtiss Flying Service, Inc.†
C. M. Keys*
C. M. Keys & Co.†; President, Curtiss Aeroplane and Motor Co., Inc.†; President,
North American Aviation, Inc.†; Director, National Air Transport, Inc.†; Director,
National Aviation Corporation†; Director, Curtiss Flying Service, Inc.†; Director,
Curtiss Aeroplane and Motor Co., Inc.†
Harry B. Knight
Knight, Dysart & Gamble, St. Louis, Missouri.
206
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Charles L. Lawrence
President, Wright Aeronautical Corporation†; Director, National Air Transport,
Inc.†; Director, National Aviation Corporation.†
Walter Marvin
Hemphill, Noyes & Co.; Director, Curtiss Flying Service, Inc.†; Director, National
Aviation Corporation†; Director, North American Aviation, Inc.†
William B. Mayo
Ford Motor Company
Earle H. Reynolds
President, National Air Transport, Inc.†; President, Peoples Trust & Savings
Bank, Chicago; Director, Curtiss Flying Service, Inc.†; Director, North American
Aviation, Inc.†; Director, National Aviation Corporation.†
Daniel M. Sheaffer*
Chief of Passenger Transportation, Pennsylvania Railroad.
James C. Willson
J. C. Willson & Co., Louisville, Kentucky; President, National Aviation
Corporation†; Director, Curtiss Aeroplane & Export Corporation†; Director,
Curtiss Flying Service, Inc.†; Director, North American Aviation, Inc.†
William H. Vanderbilt
Capitalist; Director, Curtiss Flying Service, Inc.†; Director, North American
Aviation, Inc.†
Names marked by asterisks are members of an Executive Committee.
Companies marked by daggers are owned or controlled by C. M. Keys, as of 1930.
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